Max Stirner versus morality
Since Stirner identifies the self as that which is radically unique in him, it is impossible for the self to be good or bad. 'Good' and 'bad' are universal concepts, but the self is that which cannot be categorized under any universal. We might call it haeccitas ("thisness") or unicity ("oneness"), if we can excuse the contradiction of terming the unique ("this", "one") as though it were a universal ("-ness").
If the self, as Stirner insists, is "all in all," then it has no necessary concern with anything other than itself. Thus it has no concern with universals, concepts or species as such. It may be concerned with these only incidentally, insofar as their use may facilitate the pursuit of selfish interests.
The divine is God's concern; the human, man's. My concern is neither the divine nor the human, not the true, good, just, free, etc., but solely what is mine, and it is not a general one, but is—unique, as I am unique.
Nothing is more to me than myself! [p.6.]
My concern is only what pertains to me, that is, to what is radically unique in me. I do not care about any universals such as truth, justice, and freedom, except insofar as they pertain to me.
My concern or interest cannot be expressed as a general principle, not even egoism—which is why Stirner is a genuine nihilist—but it is as unique as me. That which is most truly mine or pertaining to me is myself, for I alone exemplify the uniqueness necessary to truly pertain to me, the unique one.
This radical anti-universalism is at the heart of Stirner's thought. If we lose sight of it for a moment, we run the risk of reducing him to just another egoist, such as have existed throughout history.
Daniel Castellano 2013